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product or any potential costs arising out of the product, is one that should
be reached on its own merits, not through the confusing process of redefinition of the words written tentatively to define that very responsibility.
Steve Brook

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
Inequitable but Not Unequal Protection
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
In January 1972 a three-judge federal court in San Antonio, Texas, found
that the current system of financing public education in Texas1 discriminated on the basis of wealth against all school children living in school districts with low property values, because the system permitted citizens in affluent districts to provide a higher quality education for their children while
paying lower taxes. 2 Having found wealth to be a suspect classification and
education a fundamental interest, the district court could find no compelling
state interest to justify the present system and held as a matter of law that
plaintiffs had been denied equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
Sw. L.J. 1, 2-4 (1973). In both articles, another approach is taken, using a changing
balance concept which is perhaps not altogether inconsistent with an enterprise liability
theory. "[A product] is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude
that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the
time of the trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was designed and
marketed." (Emphasis in original.) Keeton, supra note 23, at 38. This concept was
generally employed in Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (manufacturer not liable for
the fact that a glass door is clear and is hard to detect when in place and without any
warning decals affixed, when the door is otherwise non-defective).
1 The Texas system for financing public education employs a combination of flat
grant and foundation grant systems. See J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE

63-197 (1970); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 305, 312-17 (1969). A flat grant is given to each district according to the
number of pupils in average daily attendance. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. art. 15.01(b)
(1972). The Texas Foundation School Program provides funds for three specific purposes: professional salaries, current operating expenses, and transportation expenses.
Id. art. 16.71. Twenty percent of this fund is furnished by the local school districts
according to the taxpaying ability of each district. Id. arts. 16.72-.76. The districts are
empowered by id. arts. 20.01-.08 to raise their local share through the levying and
collection of ad valorem property taxes. This system ensures a Minimum Foundation
School Program for each pupil in the state.
If the district's share, when combined with the per pupil grant, is less than the
amount necessary to support a Minimum Foundation School Program in that district,
the state provides the additional funds necessary to attain the minimum per student expenditure. Id. art. 16.79. Therefore, the amount of revenue available from local districts is totally dependent on the taxable wealth in the district and upon the tax rate
which the district imposes upon itself. Consequently, a district with high real property
valuations can generate more revenue at a lower rate than a poorer district at the
highest rate. This is the aspect of the system challenged by Rodriguez and its forerunners. See Note, An Attack on the Texas School Financing System: Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Independent School District, 26 Sw. L.J. 608 (1972).
2 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
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amendment of the United States Constitution.8 On the state's appeal, the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Held, reversed: The Texas
public school financing system does not operate to the disadvantage of any
suspect class nor impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental
interest recognized by the Constitution; though concededly imperfect, the
system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
I.

STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The Supreme Court has developed two standards for reviewing cases alleging a denial of equal protection. 4 The standard applied is related to the
nature of the state legislation and the interests of the citizens affected
thereby. In most cases the Court has employed the "traditional standard"
of review. Under this standard, the Court seeks to determine whether there
is a rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate purpose to be
achieved by it.- The Court accords a presumption of constitutionality to
the legislation, thereby placing the burden of proof upon the challenging
partyA However, when a classification employed by the state is inherently
suspect or affects a fundamental interest, the Supreme Court applies a different test referred to as the "strict judicial scrutiny" test. 7 Under this
standard, the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is denied and the
burden of justification is placed upon the state to demonstrate a "compelling
state interest" which the classification promotes.
Several classifications are now recognized as being suspect, such as race,'
nationality, 9 and alienage, 10 and the Court has consistently invalidated legislation which is based on any of these classifications. Another disfavored
classification which has emerged is that based on the wealth of the individual. The several cases indicating this classification involve either the element of indigency of the individual" or the inability to pay a fee. 12 As
3 Id. at 285.
4 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).

5 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
6 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940).
7 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 1087. The term
"invidious discrimination" has been used by the Court to express the effect produced by
a suspect classification or an infringement of a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Harper

v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
8 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v.

Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In both Korematsu
and Hirabayashi the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners, presumably because

the Government was able to show a compelling state interest which justified the classification.

10 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
11Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).

12 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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such, these cases are ambiguous as to whether wealth per se is a suspect
13
classification, and the Supreme Court has cited the cases indistinguishably.
Wealth as a classification lacks the element of precision of identification
evident in the other classifications, and this fact has prompted commentators to speak of distinctions drawn solely on the basis of an individual's
14
wealth as being de facto rather than per se discriminations.
Equally forbidden under the Constitution is legislation which infringes
upon an individual's procurement or enjoyment of certain fundamental rights
or interests. Interests which have been recognized as fundamental are voting,15 procreation, 6 travel,' 7 and criminal process.'
However, the Court
has never advanced a test by which it could be determined which interests
are fundamental and thereby entitled to constitutional protection. The importance of the interest to the individual and to society has been advanced
as a unifying thread,1 9 but a more basic theme is the necessity that the in20
terest be founded either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution.
An interest which has received much judicial attention recently is that of
education. It has frequently been recognized by the Supreme Court as
being an area of extreme importance and one in which it has taken an active part in recent years. 21 However, there are several barriers to regarding
education as a fundamental interest. First, it is not explicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution and thus is a matter to be left to the state and local
governments. As such, there is the question of distinguishing the importance
of education from the variety of other social and municipal services provided
by the local governments. Secondly, while the Court has had the opportunity in school desegregation cases to declare education a fundamental interest, it has been content instead to rely on the impermissible use of the
22
race classification to invalidate the state action.
The strict judicial scrutiny test made its foremost gains under the Warren
13 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).

The Supreme

Court blurred the rather obvious distinction between saying that no one can be made to
pay a fee for a given service and saying that one who cannot afford to pay for a given
service cannot for that reason alone be deprived of it. See Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A CriticalAnalysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny,

120 U.

PA.

L.

REV.

504, 528 (1972).

Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 20-21 (1969); Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7
HARv. Cirv. Rio-irs-Civ. Lma. L. REV. 105, 138 (1972).
14

15 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S.1 6663 (1966).
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

18 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12

(1956).
19 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,

615 (1971); Comment, Equality and the Schools: Education as a Fundamental Interest,
21 AM. U.L. REV. 716, 724 (1972).
20 This standard has been crystalizing in the recent opinions of Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S.471 (1970).
21 The traditional statement of the Court's dedication to the importance of education is found in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
22 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court. 28 However, the altered membership of the Court now indicates that
24
the extension and implementation of the test has fallen into disfavor.
Recent cases 25 suggest that while traditional classifications and interests are
still recognized, the Burger Court has refrained from extending the standard
to cases in which the extension could be justified.
CHALLENGES TO EDUCATIONAL FINANCING SYSTEMS:
EMERGENCE OF THE SERRANO RATIONALE

II.

THE

The systems employed by the states to finance public education are uniformly similar. 20 All depend to some extent upon an ad valorem property tax administered by the school district. Consequently, districts rich in
taxable wealth can generate more revenue at a lower tax rate than poorer
districts taxing themselves at a much higher rate and thereby provide more
expenditure per pupil. Arguments challenging this system consistently
allege the violation of the pupil's right to equal treatment under the law, for
the financing system fosters variations in educational expenditures among
23 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Shapiro the Court recognized the right to travel as being
fundamental but refused to ascribe its fundamentality to any particular constitutional
provision. Harper came the closest of any case to declaring wealth in any form to
be a suspect classification. See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1971).
24 While admittedly the Court has not totally refused to apply strict judicial scrutiny as evidenced by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971), the discussions of strict judicial scrutiny are markedly different
in tone and emphasis from those in Shapiro and Harper.
25 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970). In Dandridge the Court upheld a Maryland regulation which placed a ceiling
on the amount of assistance payments a family could receive even though this prevented larger families from receiving the minimum level of assistance defined by the
state as necessary to meet their needs. 397 U.S. at 474-75. While recognizing that the
administration of public welfare assistance involved the most basic economic needs of
impoverished persons, the Court was unable to find a basis for applying the strict
judicial scrutiny standard. The Court concluded that "the intractable economic, social,
and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court." Id. at 485-87. Read broadly, this language suggests
that the strict judicial scrutiny standard is not applicable in areas of social and economic
welfare such as public assistance, housing, and municipal services.
The tone and rationale of Dandridge were reiterated in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972), in which the Court rejected the contention that there is a fundamental
right to decent housing. "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every
social and economic ill. . . . Absent Constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . are legislative and not judicial functions." Id. at 74.
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court validated a provision
of the California constitution requiring voter approval before low-income housing
projects could be developed or constructed. The Court was unable to find any suggestion of racial discrimination and no mention was made by the majority of the possibility of wealth discrimination. However, this omission cannot be viewed as a mere
oversight, for Justice Marshall in his dissent vehemently attacked the article of the
California constitution as "explicitly [singling] out low-income persons to bear its
burden. .

.

.

It is . . . an explicit classification on the basis of poverty-a suspect

classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny." Id. at 144. Just as Dandridge
must be read as indicating a reluctance to enlarge the group of fundamental interests,
so must Valtierra be viewed as signalling an intent to limit the suspect classifications,
thereby limiting the application of strict judicial scrutiny.
26 See note 1 supra for the Texas system. See also Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MxCH. L. REv. 1324,
1325-26 nn.5, 6 (1972).
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districts, thus providing some pupils with a better education than others.
The first major test of a state's educational financing system was in McInnis v. Shapiro,2 8 in which a three-judge district court held that unequal
educational expenditures based on property values and tax rates of school
districts did not constitute an invidious discrimination. While admitting that

alternative methods might be superior to the existing system, the court, in
the absence of evidence of arbitrary exercise of state power or invidious
discrimination, was unable to find the system unconstitutional. In reaching
this conclusion, the court applied the traditional standard of review, being
unpersuaded by plaintiff's attempts to show that wealth was a suspect classification and education a fundamental interest. 20 Equally untenable to the
court was the alternative system proposed by the plaintiff which suggested
that expenditures be based solely on the pupil's educational needs,3 0 a
standard which the court found to be judicially unmanageable for determining
whether the equal protection clause had been violated. 3 ' Mclnnis was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, presumably ending the challenges to
2
educational financing systems A
However, in 1971 the California supreme court revitalized the issue in
Serrano v. Priest by holding that a complaint challenging the California
school financing system as violating the fourteenth amendment stated a cause
of action, thereby overruling defendant's demurrer and returning the case
to the trial court for further proceedings. 3 3 In so doing, the court found that
27 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D. Tex.
1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 871 (D. Minn. 1971); McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1968), ajj'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589-90, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96
Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).
28 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969).
29 Id. at 334.
30 Id. at 329.
31 Id. at 335-36. A year later, a federal district court in Virginia reached the same
conclusion in Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), af'd per
curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
32 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
A summary affirmance on appeal from a three-judge
federal court is entitled to the precedential weight of a decision on the merits. See
Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRAcTicE 197-99 (4th ed. 1969).
But see text accompanying note 35 infra. In 1970
a suit challenged one particular aspect of the Florida financing system which conditioned participation in the foundation program on the county limiting its tax rate to
10 mills. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). On motion for summary judgment
the limitation was held unconstitutional. However, the system itself was not challenged and the court never determined its constitutionality.
33 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). While
the court in Serrano was limited to determining the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint
against defendant's demurrer, it seems that the court was using the opportunity to pass
on this controversial issue. By treating defendant's demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded and by taking judicial notice of recent literature on the constitutionality of educational finance systems, the court was free to examine the substantive
arguments presented. Several cases, including Rodriguez, depended heavily upon these
examinations, which were undertaken merely on properly pleaded complaints and not
in a trial on the merits with full presentation of evidence by both sides. Consequently,
the later courts were content merely to rely on the Serrano rationale rather than requiring litigants to submit data and correlations to substantiate the Serrano assumptions. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972). But see Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
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the challenged system invidiously discriminated against the poor because it
made the quality of a pupil's education dependent upon the wealth of the
child's parents and neighbors. The court had little trouble distinguishing
Mclinnis, never really considering it a barrier to the examination of this
question.8 4 While the court acknowledged the summary affirmance of
McInnis, it noted that the significance of such affirmance is not always clear
and that often the practical effect is merely the equivalent of a denial of
certiorari.as More importantly, the court felt that the contentions in Serrano were significantly different from those in Mclnnis since in Serrano the
plaintiff had presented the court with a judicially manageable standard lack36
ing in Mclnnis, namely that education cannot be a function of wealth.
In upholding plaintiff's complaint, the court invoked the strict judicial
scrutiny test and declared wealth to be a suspect classification and education
a fundamental interest. The court was particularly persuaded by the combination of wealth as a suspect classification and education as a fundamental
interest as establishing a demonstrable denial of equal protection of the
law.3 7 The court found education to have two significant aspects: (1) it
is a major determinant of the individual's opportunity for social and economic
success, and (2) it has a unique influence on the individual's development
as a citizen and participant in political and community life.38 Apart from
its importance to the individual and society, education was found to be unique
in comparison with other public services provided by the state or local municipalities,3 9 thereby establishing its fundamental qualities and justifying the
imposition of the strict judicial scrutiny test. While the immediate effect
34 The California Court of Appeals relied upon McInnis to sustain defendant's demurrer. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970). However, the court in
Serrano considered Mclnnis almost as an afterthought, devoting two pages near the
end of the 25-page opinion to it.
35 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 616, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
624 (1971).
36 Id. at 617, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25; see text accompanying
note 30 supra.
37 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. It has never been
entirely clear whether both elements need to be present in a case to invoke judicial
scrutiny or whether one is sufficient. Some commentators have indicated that it might
not be the mere presence of the elements but their intensity which is important. See
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 1122; Comment, supra
note 14, at 105-06; Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A
Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (1972).
Another theory which has raised much interest is that of a balancing of interests
test, similar in many respects to the intensity theory. One of the strongest proponents
of this test is Justice Marshall, who explains it as being a test in which "concentration
must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to the individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
However, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez may be indicating that any kind of balancing
of interests and classifications is not proper. See text accompanying notes 63-6,5 infra.
38 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
615-16 (1971).
39 The five factors distinguishing education from other municipal services were:
(1) it is essential in maintaining free enterprise democracy; (2) it is universally relevant; (3) it continues over a lengthy period of one's early life; (4) it is unmatched in
the extent to which it shapes the personality of youth; (5) it is so important that
states have made it compulsory. See Comment, supra note 26, at 1337-38, for analysis
of these factors.
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of the Court's decision was merely to deny defendant's demurrer, Serrano
initiated a new round of attacks on state school financing systems.
The Serrano rationale proved to be the most successful means of attacking educational financing systems. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield4 was the first
decision to adopt wholesale the Serrano reasoning. After finding the Minnesota system structurally indistinguishable from the California system, the
court found it "unnecessary to repeat the persuasive analysis of the California
court" on the point of education as a fundamental interest, and likewise
found the decisions regarding wealth as a suspect classification "convincingly analyzed in Serrano . . . and needing no comment here .... -41
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District42 actually held the
Texas system of financing public education unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. Rodriguez relied heavily upon Serrano and consequently
failed to develop several contested propositions which Serrano had accepted
as fact.43 Also, Rodriguez, like Serrano, failed to examine recent Supreme
4
Court cases such as Dandridge v. Maryland and James v. Valtierra
45
to discern what import, if any, they might have had on the question.
Nevertheless, each court which invalidated a state's system for financing
public education was impressed with the Serrano rationale and was not
afraid to apply it.46
III.

SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. RODRIGUEZ

Rodriguez tolled the death of the Serrano rationale for invalidating a
state educational finance system under the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court expressed its disapproval
of the district court's analysis of wealth as a suspect classification, noting that
there were two threshold questions which the lower court had ignored:
who comprised the group who had been discriminated against on the basis
of wealth; and what was the nature of the discrimination? 47 The Court
examined the cases which had been cited for the proposition that wealth
40 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). Van Dusartz did not invalidate the Minnesota system, but, like Serrano, merely overruled a motion to dismiss in the nature of
a demurrer.

41 Id. at 875. Van Dusartz acknowledged and attempted to distinguish Dandridge.
which was noticeably missing in Serrano. Van Dusartz agreed with the holding in
Dandridge since there was no suspect classification involved and the importance of wel-

fare assistance was not alone sufficient to deserve constitutional protection.

Id.

Mc-

Innis was again distinguished by limiting its holding to its determination that educational need was not a judicially manageable standard. Id. at 877.
42 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972).

43 See note 33 supra. One of the weaknesses of Rodriguez was its failure adequately
to establish correlations between the wealth of the school district and the wealth of the
individuals. Rodriguez also failed to establish and define a group that had been subject
to discrimination. See Oas v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 118, 301 A.2d 93 (1973).
44 See note 25 supra.
45 See Parker v. Mandel,

344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972), in which the strict
judicial scrutiny test was rejected in reliance on Dandridge. This case is also very
critical of Serrano and Rodriguez.

4See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Milliken
v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm'n
for the Organization of School Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
47 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973).
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is a suspect classification and found that the individuals who had been discriminated against were those who, because of their impecuniosity, were
completely unable to pay for some desired benefit and as a consequence
thereof sustained an absolute deprivation of the opportunity to enjoy that
48

benefit.
Within this framework the Court had a difficult time discerning who had
allegedly been discriminated against, but concluded that it could only be
those persons who could be characterized as truly indigent. 49 However,
the facts in the case clearly demonstrated that this group had not been discriminated against, for there was no showing that the poorest people resided
in the poorest school districts nor that there had been an absolute deprivation
of education in this group. Since the equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,50 the Court found
that the appellee's argument of relative deprivation must fail.5
Being aware that the district court had not solely relied upon the wealth
classification to invoke strict judicial scrutiny, the Court examined the
proposition that education was a fundamental interest. While fully aware
of its long-time recognition of the importance of education both to the individual and to society, the Court was quick to add that the mere importance
or societal significance of an interest was not determinative of the question
of fundamentality. Rather the key to determining whether education is
fundamental lies in ascertaining "whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."5 2

While the right to

education is not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the lower court,
relying on the Serrano rationale, found that due to the peculiarly close relationship it bears to recognized fundamental interests, education takes on
48 Id. at 20.
The Court examined Griffin and Douglas to show that indigent
criminal defendants, because of their indigency, were deprived of their access to criminal appellate procedure. (Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion cited Griffin as
an example of a suspect classification which he labeled "functional indigency." Id. at 61
n.6.) In the area of voting, the Court examined Bullock, which invalidated filing fees
for primary elections, "as absolutely depriving individuals of a position on the primary
ballot." Id. at 22. Noticeably absent, however, was Harper, relied on by the district
court, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a $1.50 poll tax. To be consistent with
its analysis, the Court in Harper should merely have invalidated the tax for those unable
to pay the tax and who were thereby unable to vote. Goldstein, supra note 13, at
523-25.
40 411 U.S. at 19-20. The Court suggested three possible groups that were subject to
discrimination under the Texas system: (1) those who could be characterized as
indigent; (2) those who were relatively poorer than others; or (3) all those who happened to reside in those school districts which had relatively less taxable wealth than
other districts. It is on this point that Rodriguez was most vulnerable, having relied
largely on conclusions drawn from Serrano without having the statistical data to substantiate their conclusions. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 519-34; Schoettle, supra note
23, at 1378.
50The Court relied, in part, on Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972),
and Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1963). 411 U.S. at 24 n.57.
51411 U.S. at 25-27. The Court hypothesized a case in which wealth might be
considered as a suspect classification, but it is readily apparent that such a case is far
from any situation which has challenged the financing systems to date. Id. at 25 n.60.
But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
52 411 U.S. at 33-34. While this standard has never been previously pronounced in
such precise terms, the essence of it has appeared in recent decisions. See Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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many of the aspects of a fundamental right.53 Education was cited as being acutely necessary to exercise effectively one's first amendment right to
free speech and one's right to utilize intelligently his right to vote. This
was not disputed by the Court; however, it drew a marked distinction between the right to exercise a guaranteed right and the right to exercise that
right effectively.
[W]e have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the
most informed electoral choice ....
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of
educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short
...
. [N]o charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum
skills necessary for the enjoyment of
54 the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.
The Court recognized Rodriguez as being nothing short of a direct attack
on the way Texas had chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax
revenues, an area in which the Court has traditionally refrained from interference. 55 Several factors militated against the Court's intrusion into this
area of state affairs: a lack of both the expertise and the familiarity with
local problems which the Court felt necessary to raise and disburse public
funds properly; the lack of perfect alternatives to the present system combined
with the possibility that there is more than one constitutionally permissible
method within the limits of rationality to solve these problems; and finally,
the difficult considerations of federalism always inherent in any case concerning the equal protection clause. 5 6 These considerations were relevant
to the Court in the determination of whether the Texas system, with its
imperfections, still bore some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose under the traditional standard of review.
The Texas system for financing public education was designed to provide
an adequate minimum educational offering for every student in the state
without sacrificing the vital element of local participation in and control of
each district's schools. 57 Local control means in part the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children as well as determining
how local dollars will be spent. The appellees did not denigrate the importance of local control but insisted that the Texas financing system provides
53 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1972); see notes 38-40 supra, and accompanying text.
54 411 U.S. at 36-37.
Furthermore, the Court added that among the most ineffective participants in the political process are the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed, and
yet the Court in Dandridge and Lindsey found no fundamental right to decent food
or shelter. To have distinguished education from these necessities would indeed have
cast serious doubt on these recent decisions.
55 See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940).
56 411 U.S. at 42-44. "It must be remembered also, that every claim arising under
the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and
state power under our federal system." Id. at 44.
57 Id. at 48-49. The merit of local control was recently reaffirmed in Wright v.
Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972).
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less freedom of choice for the poorer districts than for others. 58 However,
the Court refrained from invalidating Texas' system merely because the benefits and burdens fell unevenly on the school districts. 59 While local districts
may not have as great a choice in how much they may spend on their
children's education, they nevertheless retain the power to decide how the
available funds will be allocated. 60 Absent a showing that the inequities
are the result of a system so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory,
the Court concluded that the Texas educational finance system rationally
furthered the legitimate state purpose for which it was intended.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court's detailed discussion of the components of the strict judicial
scrutiny test is the most significant aspect of this case. The Court could
have summarily disposed of appellee's arguments by noting that wealth per
se has never been acknowledged as a suspect classification nor education as
a fundamental interest. However, Rodriguez offered the Court an excellent
opportunity to interpret, define, and thereby limit the scope and applicability of the strict scrutiny test.
No case had held wealth per se to be a suspect classification, and only
one could be relied upon for the proposition that inequality in wealth is a
suspect classification. 6 ' The remainder of the cases support the majority's
interpretation that only when an individual is totally unable to pay for a certain benefit could it be said that wealth is suspect. Wealth, by its very nature, is a matter of degree rather than kind, lacking the quality of arbitrariness present inthe traditional classifications of race or alienage. The cases
which had established certain rights as fundamental involved states' attempts to deprive, infringe, or interfere with the opportunity to exercise
those rights. This threshold question of the opportunity to acquire an
education was never examined by the Court, thus obviating the need to examine the possibility that just as great a hardship might be imposed by a relative denial of access to a fundamental right as in an absolute denial of that
right.
Rodriguez strengthened the recent decisions denying fundamentality to interests much more basic to the individual than education and indicated
the Court's intention to withhold fundamental interest recognition from
other municipal services. 62 If differences in educational expenditures per
58 377 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1972).

59 411 U.S. at 54. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). The Court made it quite clear that education is no different from the host of state and municipal services financed through the
use of local property taxes.
60 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, vehemently criticized the majority's reliance on
the local-control argument because "[in Texas statewide laws regulate in fact the
most minute details of local public education." 411 U.S. at 126. This argument
prompted Justice Powell to launch into a lengthy defense of local control by listing
the specific powers of local school authorities under Texas law. Id. at 51 n.108.
61 See note 48 supra.

62 This does not preclude examination of cases under the equal protection clause
regarding the providing of municipal services, See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d
1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
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district were unconstitutional, there would be little justification for allowing
such differentials to exist in the provision of other municipal services which
are financed in a similar fashion.
Arguably, Rodriguez decided the much discussed question of whether an
important, but non-fundamental interest, when combined with a disfavored, but non-suspect classification, could require the imposition of the
strict judicial scrutiny test. The physical division of the opinion into each aspect of the test is a clear indication of this policy decision not to adopt a
balancing of interests standard of review. 63 Besides expanding the strict
judicial scrutiny test beyond its current limits, a step which the Court had
demonstrated prior to Rodriguez that it was unwilling to take, adoption of
the balancing test would have had a greater effect than the acceptance of
either wealth as a suspect classification or education as a fundamental interest. Inevitably it would have led the Court to "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added
'64
protection under an unusually stringent equal protection test."
The most recent analysis of the equal protection cases decided by the
Burger Court 65 suggests that the Court has adopted a "means-scrutiny"
model of review which assesses the means employed by the state in terms of
a substantial legislative purpose having a basis in actuality rather than in
mere theory or conjecture. In Rodriguez there were several discernible
considerations upon which the Court's finding of rationality was based,
considerations which actually may have been more persuasive than the stated
legislative purpose recognized by the Court.
Of significant concern to the Court was its lack of competency to deal
with some of the crucial questions raised in this case. Its lack of familiarity
with local problems militated against its interference in state fiscal affairs,
and the myriad of complex practical and philosophical considerations inherent in the area of education, problems which have yet to be resolved
by educators, assured the Court that their interference would only create
more problems than it would solve. 66 In addition, there was the very real
possibility that there was more than one constitutionally permissible method
of financing public education, and it was not the position of the Court to
63 See note 37 supra.
64

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969)

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

65 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-

trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RBV.

1 (1972). Gunther feels that the Warren Court strayed from the requirements of
even a minimum rationality test. Id. at 19. Consequently, the means-scrutiny test is
an attempt to return to genuine judicial scrutiny. This model of "modest interventionism" is characterized by decisions based on narrow grounds which avoid confrontations with broad value choices, and is limited by considerations of judicial competency. Id. at 24. While the Court is not unified in its adherence to this model,
several of the elements identified as indicia of the means-scrutiny test are apparent as
bases for the Court's decision in Rodriguez.
66 Such intricate questions as the relationship of educational expenditure to quality
of education, 411 U.S. at 43 n.86, the effect of teacher-pupil ratios and teachers' salaries
on the quality of education, id. at 46 n.10l, and even general questions of the proper
goals for public education, all added to the Court's feeling of impropriety to legislate
in this area. See Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining and
Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409 (1973).

